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PACE LAW REVIEW 
Volume 10 Spring 1990 Number 2 
Conference 
Gideon v. Wainwright  Revisited: What Does The 
Right To Counsel Guarantee Today?? 
I. Foreword 
Michael B. Mushlint? 
In Gideon u. Wainwright,' the Supreme Court unanimously 
held that indigent state felony defendants are constitutionally 
entitled to the appointment of trial counsel. The opinion 
aroused wide support, and even enthusiasm, almost from the 
moment it was announced in 1963.2 Two and a half decades later 
t This conference was sponsored by The Legal Aid Society on October 22, 1988 to 
celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Gideon. The conference transcript has been 
edited and expanded upon by many of the participants. The Pace Law Review would 
like to thank Michael B. Mushlin and Susan B. Lindenauer (Counsel to Executive 
Director, The Legal Aid Society) for their organizational and editorial assistance. 
It Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1966; J.D., 
Northwestern University, 1970. I am grateful for the willingness of Professors Donald L. 
Doernberg and Barbara Salken to review and comment on earlier drafts of this foreword. 
(Professor Mushlin served as the Reporter for the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Program on 
Gideon v. Wainwright.) 
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See infra note 66. 
2. The President of the American Bar Association hailed Gideon soon after it was 
decided as one of the "great advances in the administration of criminal justice in our 
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this support has not dimini~hed.~ Even former Attorney General 
Edwin Meese I11 approves.' However, are the words of praise 
only lip service to the noble idea of the right to counsel? Has 
Gideon really made a difference? Has its promise of a fair shake 
for poor criminal defendants been kept, or has Gideon meant 
only that defendants are provided with the fleeting and pres- 
sured presence of an unprepared lawyer? Moreover, does 
Gideon's extend beyond the initial criminal trial stage to other 
important quasi-criminal and civil proceedings? 
To commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Gideon, to 
reflect upon its impact today, and to assess its broader meaning, 
The Legal Aid Society of New York convened a meeting on Oc- 
tober 22, 1988, at  the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York. A diverse collection of distinguished individuals addressed 
the conference. The speakers included a leading author and 
chronicler of G i d e ~ n , ~  j dges,~practitioners,'  academic^,^ and 
country." A. LEWIS, 
Newspapers joined 
Times, for example, 
GIDEON'S TRUMPET 206 (1964) (quoting Sylvester C. Smith, Jr.). 
in the applause. Anthony Lewis reports that the St. Petersburg 
editorialized soon after Gideon that the opinion "clings to the an- 
cient democratic tradition of protecting the individual against the tyranny of any govern- 
mental agency." Id. a t  206. Lewis also reported that The Washington Post compared 
Clarence Gideon to the Old Testament Gideon who "was summoned by an angel" to lead 
a fight for justice. Id. a t  206-07. 
3. Although Gideon is one of the important Warren Court era decisions, i t  has es- 
caped the criticism that has accompanied some of that Court's criminal law decisions. 
See, e.g., Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); Grano, MirandaS 
Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 
(1988); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974). 
4. Lewis, A Muted Trumpet, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1988, a t  A31, col. 1. Former At- 
torney General Meese stated that "representation by counsel in all criminal cases is es- 
sential to the fair and effective administration of justice." Another measure of the cur- 
rent popularity of Gideon is found in the comment by Abe Krash, one of the participants 
in the petitioner's brief in Gideon's appeal to the Supreme Court, that "no responsible 
voice today urges that Gideon should be reversed." See infra p. 382 (Krash). 
5. Anthony Lewis is a New York Times correspondent and author of GIDEON'S 
TRUMPET (1964), the best-selling history of the case. 
6. Jack Weinstein, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York; Judith Kaye, Associate Judge on the New York Court of Appeals; 
and Michael Juviler, Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. 
7. Paula Deutsch, criminal defense trial attorney with The Legal Aid Society; Susan 
Salomon, a Legal Aid Society appellate lawyer; Barbara Underwood, head of the Appeals 
unit of the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office, and former Professor of Law a t  Yale Law 
School; and Ronald Tabak, an attorney with extensive experience litigatng death penalty 
cases. 
8. Burt Neuborne, a noted Constitutional Law scholar from New York University 
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even players in the Gideon drama.O The Pace Law Review has 
chosen to publish this edited version of the proceedings1° to pro- 
vide an illuminating perspective on one of the most significant 
Supreme Court decisions of our time. 
The comments of the authors range widely. Yet, two over- 
riding, and in a sense contradictory, themes dominate. One is 
celebratory. It praises the vision Gideon offers to our adversarial 
system of justice. The other is critical. It highlights the ways in 
which the Gideon promise has been betrayed, not realized." In 
this Foreword, I will preview some of the authors' reflections on 
both these themes. 
A. Gideon Celebrated 
In Gideon the highest Court in the land "reach[ed] down"12 
to hear the plea of a fifty-two year old drifter, an outcast from 
society. The story of how lawyers and judges handled Clarence 
Gideon7s handwritten misspelled appeal is worth remembering. 
As Anthony Lewis states, the "care, the vision, the imagination" 
of the attorneys appointed by the Supreme Court to represent 
Gideon on his appeal makes one "proud of law and lawyers in 
this ~ountry." '~ The simple elegance of the majority opinion 
written by Justice Black," is also impressive. In that opinion 
Justice Black proclaimed the "obvious truth [that] any person 
School of Law who served as moderator of the conference; Professor Yale Kamisar of 
Michigan Law School, a renowned Criminal Procedure scholar who was a keynote 
speaker at the conference; and Professor Charles Ogletree, recent addition to the full- 
time Harvard Law School faculty, after having had an outstanding career as a criminal 
defense practicioner and lecturer. 
9. The participants in the Gideon saga were: Abe Krash, a partner in the law firm of 
Arnold and Porter, who served as counsel with Abe Fortas on the Gideon appeal to the 
Supreme Court; and Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General of the United States during 
the Johnson Adminsitration. 
10. The remarks of the speakers at the conference were transcribed and edited ver- 
sions sent to the speakers for their review. Some of the speakers, including Professor 
Kamisar and Ronald Tabak expanded on the address that they gave at  the conference. 
11. Professor Neuborne, in a working paper prepared for the conference speakers, 
suggested these terms. See infra p. 341 (Neuborne). 
12. See infra p. 345 (Kamisar). 
18. A. LEWIS, supra note 2, at  36. For a fascinating description of the strategy deci- 
sions made by the drafters of the Supreme Court brief in Gideon, see infra pp. 380-81 
(Krash). 
14. Justice Black had expressed a similar view twenty years before in a dissenting 
opinion in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474-77 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."16 
One might justifiably wonder, as does Judge Judith Kaye, a 
keynote speaker at  the conference, why it took the Supreme 
Court so long to discover such an obvious truth.16 Dramatic evi- 
dence of this truth is to be found in Gideon itself. The trial 
court said that Clarence Gideon had done about as well repre- 
senting himself as an attorney might have done." However, 
Anthony Lewis' presentation at  the conference describing the 
making of a motion picture based on the case, disproves that 
assertion. The movie portrayed Fred Turner, the local Florida 
attorney who represented Gideon after his case was remanded 
by the Supreme Court for a new trial. Lewis vividly describes 
how Turner's deceptively simple questions, overlooked at  the 
first trial, won an acquittal for his client.18 
Just as Turner made a difference to Clarence Gideon, 
Gideon's "great civilizing statement"la that a lawyer is required 
for the trial of a serious criminal case improved the quality of 
criminal justice dispensed in this country.'O Gideon led directly 
to the dramatic growth of Legal Aid, public defender, and as- 
signed counsel programs." Today, lawyers for the poor are com- 
mon fixtures in criminal courts throughout the land. Judges at  
the conference reported that these lawyers usually provide qual- 
ity representation to their clients." But the effort required is 
staggering. 
The conference proceedings shed some light on the struggle 
defense lawyers endure to fulfill the mandate of Gideon. Paula 
Deutsch gives a gripping example in her account of the exper- 
iences of one Legal Aid Society trial attorney. She describes how 
the mire of staggering caseloads, sullen defendants, and hostile 
judges make it almost impossible to represent clients effectively 
15. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
16. See infra p. 422 (Kaye). 
17. See A. LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 238 (1964). 
18. See infra p. 385 (Lewis). 
19. See infra p. 341 (Neuborne). 
20. See infra p. 399 (Ogletree). 
21. See generally R. HERMAN, ASSOCIATION COUNSEL FOR THE POOR: CRIMINAL DE- 
FENSE IN URBAN AMERICA (1977); NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, LEGAL 
AID HANDBOOK: HOW TO ORGANIZE AND OPERATE A LEGAL AID OFFICE (1971). 
22. See infra p. 401 (Weinstein); p. 403 (Juviler). 
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and humanely. Her account is a rare description of the day to 
day professional life of Legal Aid attorneys. As much as is possi- 
ble from the printed word, one begins to appreciate what it 
takes these lawyers to, as Deutsch puts it, "go in there as their 
~hampion."'~ Susan Salomon, a Legal Aid Society appellate law- 
yer, adds her first-hand account of the difficulties faced by crim- 
inal defender appellate attorneys. They, too, must cope with 
huge caseloads and limited resources to adequately represent 
their clients on appeal. 
~ h e s e  presentations, therefore, make an important contri- 
bution to the Gideon literature. Because of the skill and dili- 
gence of attorneys like Ms. Deutsch and Ms. Salomon, the "si- 
lent voices"24 of previously unrepresented criminal defendants, 
most of whom are minority and all of whom are poor, are now 
heard in the criminal courts. But for Gideon that could not have 
happened. 
A quarter of a century later, the "romance of Gideon re- 
mains undimini~hed"'~ precisely because defense attorneys like 
Deutsch and Salomon pull justice out of a system that shouldn't 
have it.2s However, as both suggest, a remembrance of Gideon 
cannot be an occasion for celebration alone. The conference pro- 
ceedings reveal that Gideon's deeper vision of a system of justice 
in which money does not matter is far from realized. 
B. Gideon's Promise Betrayed 
Twenty-five years after Gideon, adequate legal representa- 
tion for poor defendants has not been obtained. For defendants 
in capital cases, there is a crisis in representation; for civil de- 
fendants, Gideon has yet to mean that they have even the hope 
that counsel will be available to them. For many of the nation's 
poor, therefore, the stark reality is that the legal system func- 
tions "as if Gideon had never been decided."27 
Gideon's promise has not yet been realized even in the 
criminal trial process with which Gideon dealt directly. Counsel 
23. See infra p. 387 (Deutsch). 
24. See infra p. 400 (Ogletree). 
25. Lewis, supra note 70. 
26. See infra p. 340 (Neuborne). (This does not appear as an actual quote.) 
27. See infra p. 341 (Neuborne). 
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are invariably assigned to these cases. Unfortunately, however, 
not all defense counsel measure up to the standards of Paula 
Deutsch and Susan Salomon. Barbara Underwood reveals that 
in many criminal cases the assignment of a lawyer means only 
that there is a "warm body" at  counsel table.28 Underwood's 
story of a defense counsel who failed to investigate points on 
appeal even when prompted by the district attorney, illustrates 
how far we have to go to realize the promise of Gideon for the 
typical criminal defendant. Chief Judge Jack Weinstein's discus- 
sion adds another dimension to the problem: defense counsel 
who serve only as technocrats, unconcerned with the human di- 
mension of the legal problems that their clients present.29 
Conference speakers offer a number of explanations for this 
sorry state of affairs. Professor Charles Ogletree, for example, 
points to public defender systems that provide little training for 
attorneys and few resources to investigate and prepare cases.30 
The current Supreme Court's treatment of the right to counsel 
also has contributed to this problem according to Professor Yale 
Kamisar, a keynote speaker at  the conference. As early as 1932 
the Court held that the right to appointed counsel means the 
right to "effe~t ive"~~ aid. However, the Court, in recent years, 
has drained almost all meaning from this term. Professor 
Kamisar uses Strickland u. W a s h i n g t ~ n ~ ~  to illustrate this point. 
Strickland held that to prevail with an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, a defendant must establish not only that his 
attorney's conduct was "outside the wide range of professionally 
competent as~ is tance ,"~~  but also that the failure was the direct 
cause of the c o n ~ i c t i o n . ~ ~  According to Professor Kamisar this is 
28. See infra p. 396 (Underwood). 
29. See infra p. 403. (Weinstein). 
30. See infra p. 398-99 (Ogletree). For a further discussion o f  how large caseloads 
and inadequate funding o f  agencies providing defense counsel t o  the indigent have 
eroded the right t o  counsel see Klein, T h e  Emperor Gideon Has N o  Clothes: The  Empty  
Promise of the Consitutional Right to Effective Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 625 
(1986). 
31. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
32. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Professor Kamisar discusses this case in the specific context 
o f  death penalty litigation. While Strickland has had a peculiarly disastrous e f fect  on 
death penalty litigation, Professor Kamisar's criticisms are applicable t o  other criminal 
cases as well. See infra notes 171-211 and accompanying text .  
33. 466 U.S. at 690. 
34. Id. at 694. 
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a "herculean task."36 The result of Strickland is that the Su- 
preme Court, in fact, has isolated itself from effectively review- 
ing problems in implementing G i d e ~ n . ~ ~  
Death penalty cases provide a second example of Gideon 
betrayed. Ron Tabak, a well-known advocate for the con- 
demned, recounts numerous shocking instances of the failure to 
provide counsel in these cases. An attorney can literally make a 
life or death difference in capital cases, but all too often, Tabak 
explains, the lawyer assigned to the case is not up to the job." 
Frequently, death penalty lawyers neglect to even present miti- 
gating evidence a t  the penalty phase of the proceedings. As Pro- 
fessor Kamisar says, "even in the most outrageous and gruesome 
murder cases, juries have voted for life . . . when provided some 
basis for mercy, such as the terrible circumstances affecting the 
defendant's formative de~elopment."~' But because of numerous 
failures of defense counsel to develop this aspect of their cases, 
often only the prosecutor is heard by the jury that fixes the 
penalty.3B 
Tabak and Kamisar also decry the failure to assign counsel 
in death penalty habeas corpus cases. I t  is there that constitu- 
tional errors can be detected, corrected, and unjust executions 
prevented. Tabak states that from one-third to one-half of all 
death penalty convictions are vulnerable to reversal or retrial as 
a result of habeas corpus  proceeding^.^^ At the time of the con- 
ference, the Fourth Circuit had offered some cause for optimism 
by holding that death penalty inmates were entitled to counsel 
in these proceedings as part of the constitutionally guaranteed 
right of "access to the courts."41 However, that hope was dashed 
35. See infra p. 367 (Kamisar). 
36. See infra p. 370 (Kamisar). 
37. See infra p. 408 (Tabak).  Tabak,  T h e  Death of Fairness: The  Arbitrary and 
Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty i n  the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANCE 797, 803-07 (1986). 
38. See infra p. 362 (Kamisar). 
39. See infra p. 362 (Kamisar). Professor Kamisar assigns as a major reason for th is  
default the "scandalously little capital defense lawyers are paid in  some states." See  
infra p. 365. Professor Kamisar reports that in  some southern states lawyers earn less 
than a $1,000 per case, making the actual rate o f  compensation for t h e  diligent attorney 
less than the  attorney could earn "pumping gas." See infra p. 365-66. 
40. Tabak, supra note 37, at 829-34. 
41. Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th  Cir. 1988), reu'd, 109 S .  C t .  2763 
(1989). 
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when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case only one 
week  afterward^:^ and later reversed by a five to four vote.43 
The failure to apply Gideon to serious civil proceedings is 
the final area in which Gideon has not been realized. The Su- 
preme Court has limited Gideon to criminal trials.44 In place of 
Gideon's firm requirement of an attorney in every case, for civil 
and quasi-criminal cases the Court has resurrected the case by 
case Betts u. Bradyq6 approach, which requires the losing party 
to demonstrate on the record that counsel would have made a 
difference to the outcome of the case. Thus, in non-criminal 
cases an indigent litigant will not be entitled to counsel unless 
she can affirmatively demonstrate that an attorney would mate- 
rially affect the outcome of the proceedings, no matter how 
grevious the d e p r i v a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Because the right to counsel has not 
been recognized outside the criminal trial process, in many 
cases, such as eviction proceedings in which poor defendants 
face the loss of life's very necessities, they must proceed without 
the aid of c~unsel . '~  The resulting eviction of thousands of poor 
unrepresented tenants, in Professor Kamisar's words, "is to put 
42. Giarratano v. Murray, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988) (certiorari granted). 
43. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989). Professor Kamisar foreshadowed 
this development when he expressed the hope that the "[hligh Court not address this 
issue for several more years, in the hope" that in the meantime other lower courts will 
follow the lead of the Fourth Circuit. See infra p. 375. 
44. The Court has refused claims that the right to assigned counsel attaches auto- 
matically to probation revocation proceedings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791 
(1973). Some states, however, have enacted statutes,insuring their citizens the right to 
counsel in probation revocation proceedings. See, e.g., Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181 
(10th Cir. 1985); State v. Coltrane, 307 N.C. 511, 299 S.E.2d 199 (1983). The Court has 
also refused claims that the right to assigned counsel attaches automatically to state- 
initiated proceedings to terminate parental rights. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 
U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981). 
45. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Gideon the Court had rejected this 1942 ruling. Gideon 
v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). 
46. This is true even if the civil proceeding threatens deprivation of constitution- 
ally-protected rights, such as parental rights. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 
U.S. 18, 27 (1981). Professor Kamisar criticizes this doctrine in practice because it leads 
to the absurdity of needing a lawyer to demonstrate that the defendant needs a lawyer. 
Nevertheless, the Court's opinions in these cases read "as if the Betts v. Brady approach 
had never been discredited." See infra p. 354 (Kamisar). 
47. See infra p. 352-53 (Kamisar). For a description of the harsh consequences of 
the deprivation of counsel to poor tenants, see Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to 
Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557 (1988). 
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it mildly, anomalous - and, to put it strongly, s canda l~us . "~~  
While Professor Kamisar is not optimistic that the Court 
will soon change direction,4e the conference proceedings do con- 
tain the seeds of hope. Judge Kaye in her remarks reminds us 
that "[sltate courts throughout the country [have] recently . . . 
been more aggressive participants in the process of defining and 
protecting individual rights,"60 by "increasingly . . . turning to 
their own state constitutions as the dispositive ground for their 
decisions . . . . I t  may well be that through such interpreta- 
tions the true meaning of Gideon finally will be realized.62 
C. Gideon Rediscovered 
Gideon is measured as much in intangibles as in the precise 
contours of its holding. Perhaps the most lasting significance of 
Gideon is that it "inspire[d] the most profound dialogue about 
the fundamental nature of this nation's pledge of justice for 
That question is as important and as unresolved today as 
it was when Gideon was decided a quarter of a century ago. 
On one side Gideon offers the sterile right to appointed 
counsel that is satisfied by the simple assignment of an over- 
worked, undertrained young attorney without the 'ability or re- 
sources to make a major difference in the proceeding. But the 
conference proceedings offer a different and much more expan- 
sive vision of Gideon. That vision is "about obtaining access for 
everybody . . . [to] justiceMs4 by ensuring that all persons are 
given fair treatment in the courts regardless of their financial 
status. 
If this broader vision of Gideon more closely conforms to 
our aspirations, then the work started in Gideon is far from 
over. 
48. See infra p. 353 (Kamisar). 
49. Indeed, Professor Kamisar predicts that "it may take another forty years before 
we see the emergence of a federal constitutional right to appointed counsel in eviction 
proceedings." See infra p. 353 (Kamisar). 
50. See infra p. 424 (Kaye). 
51. See in f ra  p. 425 (Kaye). 
52. For example, litigation to provide the right to counsel in eviction proceedings is 
pending in New York state courts. See in f ra  note 112 and accompanying text. 
53. See infra p. 419 (Kaye). 
54. See infra p. 415 (Katzenbach). 
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The increasing sophistication of the law and the increasing 
breakdown of society into "haves and a permanent underclass of 
have  not^"^^ makes the need for access to lawyers more critical 
than ever. But, as the conference reveals, the need is not even 
close to being met, and in many ways is even less well served 
now than in the past. For example, legal services programs, that 
at the time of Gideon were flourishing, are now under unrelent- 
ing pressure from Washington . . . [and] are grossly 
i n a d e q ~ a t e . " ~ ~  
As Judge Kaye states: 
We may still refer to the noble idea that every defendant stands 
equal before the law, but in fact we have reconciled ourselves to 
standing short of achieving it. Ironically, with society and the law 
moving briskly toward a new century there may well be even 
greater imbalances and distances between individuals like Clar- 
ence Gideon and acquittals after trial with effective counsel a t  de- 
fendant's side. The law grows increasingly sophisticated as public 
dedication to the principle of equal justice seems to dwindle.57 
What can be done to stop this "terrible descent from shin- 
ing ideals into tarnished reality?"58 The conference suggested 
one answer: for Gideon to be truly realized, this generation's ' 
lawyers must devote the same devotion and energy to the task as 
the generation of lawyers that led the Court to the holding in 
G i d e ~ n . ~ ~  As a young lawyer Abe Krash threw himself into the 
task of writing the Gideon Supreme Court brief. At the confer- 
ence he looked back a t  that time as one of the proudest mo- 
ments of his life.60 If that spirit survives, there is reason to hope 
with Yale Kamisar that Gideon's trumpet will sound again.61 
55. See infra p. 403 (Weinstein). 
56. See infra p. 403 (Weinstein). A recent report o f  a committee o f  lawyers commis- 
sioned by  New York Court o f  Appeals Chief Judge Sol Wachtler t o  study the advisability 
o f  requiring mandatory pro bono representation of  indigents details the present crisis o f  
unmet civil legal needs. Following an exhaustive review, the  Committee came t o  the  con- 
clusion that " the  poor need legal help t o  obtain basic human requirements and t o  an 
appalling degree cannot get it." Committee t o  Improve the Availability o f  Legal Services, 
Preliminary Report to  the  Chief Judge of the State of New York, 15 (June 30, 1989). 
57. See infra p. 425 (Kaye).  
58. See infra p. 403 (Weinstein). 
59. See infra p. 379 (Krash). 
60. See infra p. 383 (Krash). 
61. See infra p. 378 (Kamisar). 
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